Theories of visual attention suggest that working memory representations automatically guide attention 23 toward memory-matching objects. Some empirical tests of this prediction have produced results consistent 24 with working memory automatically guiding attention. However, others have shown that individuals can 25 strategically control whether working memory representations guide visual attention. Previous studies have 26 not independently measured automatic and strategic contributions to the interactions between working 27 memory and attention. In this study, we used a classic manipulation of the probability of valid, neutral, and 28 invalid cues to tease apart the nature of such interactions. This framework utilizes measures of reaction time 29 (RT) to quantify the costs and benefits of attending to memory-matching items and infer the relative 30 magnitudes of automatic and strategic effects. We found both costs and benefits even when the memory-31 matching item was no more likely to be the target than other items, indicating an automatic component of 32 attentional guidance. However, the costs and benefits essentially doubled as the probability of a trial with a 33 valid cue increased from 20% to 80%, demonstrating a potent strategic effect. We also show that the 34 instructions given to participants led to a significant change in guidance distinct from the actual probability 35 of events during the experiment. Together, these findings demonstrate that the influence of working 36 memory representations on attention is driven by both automatic and strategic interactions. 37
Introduction

43
To direct our limited-capacity perceptual attention to the 44 important objects in the complex scenes of daily life, we must have processes during a single experimental paradigm. Posner and Snyder (1975) applied the logic to their findings from 153 the probability manipulation in the following way. They found that all 154 probability conditions led to a benefit, with only a small increase in 155 the size of the benefit as the probability of valid cues increased. In 156 contrast, costs were not present in the low-probability condition, and 157 only appeared in the medium and high probability conditions. Based 158 on this pattern of effects, the authors concluded that priming led to an 159 automatic benefit, but costs depended on the participant's strategic 160 use of the cue information.
161
The classic logical framework and manipulations of Posner and 162 Snyder (1975) found were in fact due to storage of the prime stimuli in working 168 memory.
169
One existing study suggests that probability manipulations can 
Experiment 1 180
In Experiment 1, we examined the automatic and strategic 181 components of the guidance of attention by working memory 182 representations across three probability levels. We applied the classic 183 probability manipulation used by Posner et al. (Posner, 1978 (Posner, , 1980  184 Posner & Snyder, 1975) to the typical dual-task paradigm used in 185 studies of working memory guidance of attention. In the task 186 illustrated in Fig. 1 , participants were first shown a colored square.
187
They needed to remember the color until the end of the trial so that However, a more conservative prediction derived from the account of 224 Han and Kim (2009) would be that strategic effects may emerge in 225 later RTs, but should not be present in the early RTs.
226
To test the more detailed predictions about the dynamics of 227 strategic cognitive control and to examine how the pattern of RTs 228 changed across the three probability conditions, we also computed 229 vincentized cumulative RT distributions of valid, neutral, and invalid 230 trials in each probability condition (Ratcliff, 1979 having normal color vision and normal or corrected-to-normal acuity.
245
After obtaining informed consent, the participants were randomly 246 assigned to one of the three probability conditions (20%, 50%, or 80% 247 memory-target match trials, as described in detail below). Two 248 participants were replaced because they failed to respond on more 249 than 25% of trials, and one additional subject was replaced due to .65°× .65°.
272
Each trial began with a 500-ms presentation of the fixation cross,
273
followed by a 500-ms presentation of the memory-sample item. After 
309
At the beginning of the experiment, a string of letters or digits (i.e.,
310
"a,b,c,d", "1,2,3,4", "6,7,8,9", or "w,x,y,z") was presented until the 311 participant made a button-press response to begin the experiment.
312
After each block of trials, participants were given a 15-second break 313 during which they were presented with a new set of articulatory 314 suppression instructions. Participants were required to repeat these 315 letters or digits aloud at a rate of 3-4 per second throughout each trial 
Experiment 2 464
To determine the source of the effects we observed in Experiment 1,
465
we held the actual probability of the different trial types constant and 2 The classic recommendation for creating individual cumulative distributions functions suggests a minimum of 10 observations per cell per subject (Ratcliff, 1979) . Given the nature of the probability manipulation, we were not able to achieve this number of observations for all cells for each subject in each group (i.e. the 20% group only had 24 valid trials). Therefore, these results should be viewed with some caution. However, examination of the pooled group data leads to similar results. Costs and benefits of the 1st quantile of the pooled group data are very similar to the means calculated from individual distributions (20% group 78 ms costs and 93 ms benefits, 50% group 126 ms costs and 127 ms benefits, 80% group 217 ms costs and 195 ms benefits). Observation of the first correct pooled group responses for valid and invalid trials is telling. The first correct invalid response for the 20% group was made before the first correct valid response, whereas the first correct invalid response for the 50% group was made after 9.6% of valid responses, and the first correct invalid response for the 80% group was made after 58.3% of all correct valid responses. Consistent with these group findings, more recent work suggests that the 10-observation threshold is not particularly special because lower sample sizes do not create systematic biases in the observed distributions provided the data are not so sparse such that large portions of the cumulative distributions functions are missed (Van Zandt, 2000). Fig. 4 . Memory-task accuracy from Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% withinsubjects confidence intervals. effects in Experiment 1, then our instructional manipulation should not 
545
To directly assess the influence of instruction on search performance,
546
we next examined the costs and benefits separately. We found that 547 there was no effect of instruction on costs (p = .20). However,
548
instructions that the memory-match would be more likely to be the 549 target led to increased benefits (F (1, 32) = 4.72, MSE= 9180, p b .05).
550
Thus, the analyses of costs and benefits indicate that benefits were more 551 sensitive to strategic control governed by the instructions alone than the 552 costs, which more closely tracked the objective probability of trial types.
553
To directly compare the magnitude of the RT costs and benefits
554
between Experiment 1 and 2 we performed an additional analysis 555 using the within-subjects factor of memory-match influence (costs or 556 benefits) and the between-subjects factors of probability (20% versus 557 80%) and experiment (Experiment 1 versus 2). As expected, we found when they had just searched an array where the memory item as the 587 target (i.e., valid trials, M = 97% correct) compared to when the 588 memory item was not present (i.e., neutral trials, M = 95% correct) 3 An alternative explanation for the influence of the probability manipulation on costs and benefits is inter-trial effects. Increasing the probability of valid trials also increases the probability of N − 1 valid trials, which has the potential of increasing the costs and benefits. To address this alternative explanation, in separate analyses, we examined the influence of N − 1 array type on costs and benefits. We found no main effect of N − 1 array type or interaction of array type and condition (ps N .10), indicating that this alternative explanation cannot explain the influence of probability.
and when the memory item was a distractor (i.e., invalid trials, memory is used to guide attention. In contrast, the costs in
610
Experiment 2 were not significantly increased by instruction alone.
611
We discuss possible explanations for this difference in top-down 612 control on costs and benefits in the General discussion. In summary, with low cue validity probabilities).
638
The findings of benefits on RT by Posner and Snyder (1975) 
650
The findings from Experiment 2 provide a useful piece of additional 651 evidence in that they show that the benefits are also more sensitive to commented during the debriefing period that they found it easier to 701 start their search with the memory-color matching item.
702
We also found that the strategic effects were just as evident in the 703 earliest tail of the RT distribution as in later RTs. This is contrary to the 
